Technical root cause — a defense-in-depth regression across two layers.
Layer 1 (application): POST /api/v1/quotes had been hardened with withAuth in the past; that hardening was not present in the attack-time version. The handler ran without an auth wrapper and accepted userId from the request body, passing it into the service layer as sender identity.
Layer 2 (monitor): the blockchain monitor historically refused to create a Message row unless the on-chain tx's from matched one of the claimed sender's registered wallets. That check was dropped during a MultiToken consolidation refactor (~25k lines deleted) that merged three legacy handlers into one.
The omission wasn't caught because later features (router-mediated sends, x402 agent payments) legitimately require decoupling on-chain payer from sender, making the absent binding appear intentional in review. With neither layer enforcing the binding, each assumed the other was.
The post this replies to
Terminus needs JavaScript to show replies and pictures.